



	Candles	Mincha	DafYomi	Shiur	Shachris	זק"ש
Friday	7:22	6:50/7:32				9:33
Shabbos		7:15	6:00	7:00	9:00	9:33
Sunday		7:35	7:15		7:30	9:32

IMPORTANCE OF

The *Gemara* (*Shevuos* 30b) relates that Rav Huna's widow was a party to a *Din Torah* brought before Rav Nachman. Because of the rule that **אשת חבר כחבר** (a scholar's wife is like the scholar), Rav Nachman felt compelled to stand up for her when she entered the room. However, Rav Nachman was aware that doing so would discourage the opposing party, possibly affecting his ability to present an effective case. He therefore told his attendant to set a goose loose in the room, which would give him an excuse to stand. The *Gemara* proceeds to ask, we know that during presentations and arguments the litigants are permitted to sit, so Rav Nachman could as well. But what could Rav Nachman do during *G'mar Din* (the conclusion), when the rule is that the litigants must stand and the judges sit? The *Gemara* answers that he must half-sit, leaning against the wall as if he is removing a shoe. The *RaN* notes that the *Gemara* was concerned only with *G'mar Din* because that is a relatively short period of time in which to half-sit. However, if not for the fact that the litigants were permitted to sit during the presentations, Rav Nachman would have had a problem, being required to stand as long as Rav Huna's widow was standing. The *Gemara* (*Kidushin* 33b) derives from the *Posuk*: **מפני שיבה תקום והדרת פני זקן** that one must rise when a *Talmid Chochom* appears, either within one's eyesight or within 4 *Amos*, and remain standing until the *Talmid Chochom* is beyond one's 4 *Amos* or reaches his destination. What if the *Talmid Chochom* stops within one's 4 *Amos* and remains standing there in conversation with someone? May one sit down in such a situation or must one remain standing? The *Har Tzvi* (א"ח 107) holds that from the *RaN* it appears that one must remain standing as long as the *Talmid Chochom* is standing in his proximity.

QUESTION OF THE WEEK:

Two men are standing together, *davening Shacharis* at the same time. One is **יצא Krias Shema** while the other is not. Why?

ANSWER TO LAST WEEK:

(Can a pauper be forced to get a job or beg to support his wife?)
The *Rema* (ע"א 70:2) cites a "יש אומרים" opinion that one must hire himself out in order to support his wife but the *GRA* (*ibid* 9) disagrees, based on a *Tosafos*. *Halichos HaGRA* (188) adds that forcing him into employment or begging would create a situation where if he refused, and the alternative is to give her a divorce, there might be a serious question of **גט מעושה** (forced *Get*).

DIN'S CORNER:

If one forgot to say a *Brocho Acharona* after eating food, he may say it until digestion (**עיכול**) begins. The sign that digestion has begun is when one feels hungry again. If one is unsure of the source of his hunger, he should eat a food that requires the same *Brocho Acharona* and then say it for both. (*Chayei Adam* 50:23)

DID YOU KNOW THAT

The *Mishna* (*Nedarim* 64a) discusses how a *Chochom* is able to establish regret for someone who made a vow and now wishes to be released from it. The *Chochom* provides a **פתח** (opening) by asking: "would you have made the vow if you had known ... [certain consequences]". If he says "no" he is released from the vow. There is a *Machlokes* between R' Eliezer and the *Chachomim* over the use of a subsequent development (**נילד**) as a **פתח**, since the consequence did not exist at the time of the vow. R' Eliezer allows it while the *Chachomim* maintain he would not have refrained from making the vow over something he could not have known at the time. R' Meir attempted a compromise, where the vow states the premise it is based on, and it turns out eventually to have changed. For example, if a man vows he will not marry a certain woman because her father is wicked, and then discovers that the father has died or done *Teshuvah*, R' Meir holds that the vow is no longer effective. The **רא"ח** (2:72) rules that if the father should lapse again into wickedness, the vow is revived. He derives this from the *Gemara* (*Nedarim* 47a) which says that if a vow prevents one from enjoying his neighbor's house, if the house is sold the vow becomes ineffectual. The *Rivash* (356) adds that if the neighbor buys it back, the vow is revived. However, the *Mishna L'Melech* (*Nedarim* 8:2) holds that with regard to a sold house, the vow still exists but has nowhere to apply, since the neighbor currently owns no house. When he acquires a house, the pre-existing vow now has a focus and revives. With regard to the wicked father however, once he does *Teshuvah*, the vow disappears because its premise disappeared. If he reverts back, a new vow would be necessary. The *Oneg Yom Tov* explains the difference between **כי ביום הזה יכפר עליכם** (Yom Kippur will atone for you) versus **לטהר אתכם** - to purify you, along such lines. *Kaparah* does not erase the sin even if it makes it irrelevant (e.g. the **חטא העגל** remains forever). The *Taharah* of Yom Kippur on the other hand removes the sin entirely.

A Lesson Can Be Learned From:

A woman came to R' Shmuel Salant on a Friday afternoon in Yerushalayim, lamenting the fact that as she was cooking her meat for Shabbos, some milk fell into the pot. It was too late to start over - what should she do? R' Shmuel asked her to describe everything, the size of the pot, the amount of meat, the spices, the amount of water, the amount of milk, etc... When R' Shmuel was still not comfortable with the presumption of a 60:1 ratio, he asked the woman where she had purchased the milk and bade her return to him in an hour. R' Shmuel then summoned the milk dealer and cunningly extracted from him the amount of water he adds in to his milk before selling it. With this information, the ratio was easily established to nullify the milk and so, he permitted the meat when the woman returned.

P.S. Sholosh Seudos sponsored this week by the Sorscher family.