



	Candles	Mincha	DafYomi	Shiur	Shachris	פרשת: במדבר	סזק"ש
Friday	8:06	6:50/8:15					9:10
Shabbos		8:00	6:30	7:30	9:00		9:10
Sunday		8:15	7:30		7:30		9:10

IMPORTANCE OF

The Gemara (Berachos 6b) states that one who *davens* behind a Shul is called wicked. *Rashi* comments that the entrance to all Shuls was on the east, as stated in the *Tosefta* (3:22), based on the *Posuk*: והחונים לפני המשכן קדמה. Since people from Bavel normally faced west to Eretz Yisroel they would enter the Shul from the east, facing the Aron HaKodesh. However, *Tosafos* states that this was true only in Bavel, which was to the east of Eretz Yisroel. Those to the west, in order to enter facing the Aron HaKodesh on מזרח would have to enter from the west side. The *Shulchan Aruch* (אור"ח 150:5) rules accordingly, that the entrance should always face the Aron. The *Chasam Sofer* (אור"ח 27) asks why the *Tosefta*, cited by *Rashi* seems to have been ignored, when it seems to be supported by the following Gemara. In *Berachos* (8a) the Gemara says that when one enters a Shul, he should always walk in for a length of 2 door widths. The *MaHaram M'Rottenburg* explains that this is to distance himself from distractions outside the Shul. This is also the reason why Shul windows are generally higher than a person's height, to prevent one from looking out and being distracted. If however, one enters facing the Aron HaKodesh (not like the *Tosefta*), what need is there for the 2 door-widths if he is in any case facing away from the outside that he entered from? It must be that he always enters from מזרח and since he will be turning around to face מזרח in order to *daven*, he should go in a short length to distance himself from the outside distractions. Despite the fact that the *Tosefta* seems to be correct, the accepted custom has always been as the *Shulchan Aruch* stated it and should therefore not be changed.

QUESTION OF THE WEEK:

Does one say a *brocho*: שתתן מכבודו when seeing a king on film?

ANSWER TO LAST WEEK:

(Where is a witness believed only if testifying alone?)

The Gemara (*Kesubos* 22b) states that a woman is believed to say that her husband divorced her, because she would not be so brazen as to lie about such a thing to his face. However, if another witness also says the same thing, she would be brazen enough to lie and as such, would not be believed.

DIN'S CORNER:

It is אסור for two people to be seated at the same table where one eats *Milchig* (dairy) and the other eats *Fleishig* (meat), if they are previously acquainted. The meat so restricted must be kosher; if a non-kosher נבילה is on the table with other kosher meat, there is no problem. However, one may not bring non-kosher bread to the table. If the 2 people are sitting so far apart that there is no threat of one eating from the other, they may sit at the same table. (*Shulchan Aruch* יו"ד 88:4; see *Pischei Teshuvah* 3)

DID YOU KNOW THAT

The *Mishna* (*Taharos* 4:12) states that wherever a doubt arises as to whether the offspring of a person or animal is a *Bechor*, the rule is: המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה - the one seeking to exact goods or payment from another has the burden of proof. Thus, for a *Kohen* to demand 5 *Selaim* for a *Pidyon HaBen*, or to demand a firstborn animal, he must prove that it is in fact a viable firstborn. The Gemara (*Bechoros* 49a) states that according to R' Akiva, a newborn on his 30th day is a ספק נפל - a child whose viability is still in doubt. Therefore, if the child dies on the 30th day and the father had already redeemed him, he cannot demand return of his money unless he can prove it was due to non-viability; if he had not yet redeemed him, the *Kohen* cannot demand the money unless he can prove the child was viable. R' Chaim Paltiel points out that in *Parshas Bamidbar*, as each Levi was exchanged for a *Bechor*, exempting him from *Pidyon*, the Leviim were counted - מן חדש ומעלה (from 30 days old and on), and *Rashi* comments: משיצא מכלל נפלים - they qualified as soon as they were no longer in the category of non-viability. However, when a *Bechor* of *Bnei Yisroel* was counted prior to the exchange, the *Posuk* also says: מן חדש ומעלה but here *Rashi* adds: ספק נפלים - as soon as they were no longer in the category of doubtful non-viability. R' Tzvi Pesach Frank explains that a baby Levi on his 30th day could exempt a *Bechor*, since he was no longer a ודאי נפל but at most a ספק נפל for that day. Thus, a Levi is counted on the 30th day, when he leaves the category of ודאי נפל. A *Kohen* cannot demand 5 *Selaim* from the father of a *Bechor* without proof that the Levi used was not viable for the exchange. However, where a firstborn *Yisroel* reaches his 30th day, in his state of ספק נפל, a *Kohen* cannot demand 5 *Selaim* until the child is declared viable. This will not happen until after the 30th day, when the ספק ends.

A Lesson Can Be Learned From:

The Brisker Rav once spent Shabbos in a certain city and went to the Beis HaMadrash of the Radziner Rebbe to hear *Krias HaTorah*. In the middle of the *Kriah*, a mistake was found in the *Sefer Torah*. The Rebbe instructed the *Gabbai* to ask the Brisker Rav what should be done. The Brisker Rav, to everyone's surprise, said they could continue to finish the *Parsha*. Several days later, the Rebbe happened to meet the Brisker Rav and asked him how he could have issued such a ruling. The Brisker Rav explained to him that he had assessed the situation and had realized, that if he ruled the *Sefer Torah* to be *Posul*, the *Chasidim* would without a doubt have found and brought another *Sefer Torah* for the Rebbe to hear *Krias HaTorah*. The problem was, he had seen the town *Eruv* and it had several problems. To prevent a *Chilul Shabbos* from taking place, he held it was possible to rely on the *Rambam's* opinion that one may read from a *Sefer Torah* that is *Posul*.

P.S. *Sholosh Seudos* sponsored this week by the Soofian family.

This issue is dedicated:

לד"ר פערל ב"ר יצחק הלוי